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emporary help employment grew
dramatically over the last decade,
accounting for 10 percent of net
employment growth in the United States
during the 1990s. Evidence from case
studies and business surveys suggests
dramatic growth in the outsourcing of
functions to contract companies as well
(Abraham and Taylor 1996; Houseman
2001). Through case studies in a
representative manufacturing, service, and
public sector industry, we examined why
employers are increasing the use of these
nonstandard employment arrangements
and the implications of this increased use
for wages, benefits, and working
conditions in low-skilled labor markets.
Temporary help and contract company
workers perform work for a client, usually
at the client's work site, but they are the
legal employees of an agency or contract
company. Because workers in these
arrangements often receive lower
compensation than they would if they
were employees of the client
organization, the growth of temporary
help and contracting out generally is
viewed as inimical to workers' interests.
We find, however, that the story is not that
simple. Our case study evidence points to
circumstances in which workers are likely
to be adversely affected by the

outsourcing of jobs to agencies or
contractors. In other situations, however,
the effects on low-skilled workers appear
to be minimal, and in some situations they
may even be beneficial.

Incidence of Temporary Help and
Contracting Out
We studied the use of temporary
services and contracting out in five
Midwest automotive supply
establishments, six hospitals in Michigan
and North Carolina, and seven Michigan
public school districts. 1 Low-skilled jobs
comprise a large share of employment in
all three of the industries studied. The
majority of auto supply workers are in
low- or semi-skilled production positions.
Hospitals have shifted work away from
high-skilled, high-paid registered nurses
to low-skilled, low-paid nurse assistants.
Moreover, hospitals utilize a large number
of workers in low-skilled clerical, food
service, and housekeeping positions.
Typically, 15 to 20 percent of a public
school's staff is in low- and semi-skilled
noninstructional positions in such areas as
food service, cleaning, and transportation.
The use of temporary agency help in
low-skilled functional areas was common
in our auto supply and hospital case
studies. Contracting out low-skilled
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functions was prevalent in hospitals and
public schools. Four out of the five auto
supply plants utilized temporary agency
help in production positions during the
period of our interviews. Among the two
Unionized plants in our study, the use of
agency temporaries was strictly limited at
one and prohibited at the other. In two
nonunion plants, temporary employment
accounted for over 20 percent of
production employment.
Although most hospitals in our study
kept poor records of their use of agency
temporary help in support functions, they
reported using agency temps in many
low-skilled clinical, clerical,
housekeeping, and food service positions.
Data from the hospitals that did keep
good records suggest a moderately high
level of temporary employment. For
instance, in one hospital, agency temps
worked 11 percent of hours in food
services, 5 percent of hours in
housekeeping, and 14 percent of hours in
clerical functions.
We observed several cases in public
schools where noninstructional support
services, including custodial,
transportation, and food services
operations, were entirely contracted out.
Interestingly, however, it is quite common
for hospitals and public schools to
contract out only management functions
and to keep workers on their payroll.
Whereas all of the hospitals we studied
contracted out the management of food
services or housekeeping services, none
contracted out the entire operation.
Among public schools, two districts
contracted out their entire food services
operation, but three contracted out only
the management function.
Implications for Workers
In several instances, management
decisions to use agency temporaries or to
contract out functions appeared to have a
direct, adverse effect on the wages,
benefits, or other working conditions of
low-skilled workers.2 These cases
involved the substitution of agency or
contract company staff for regular
employees on a long-term basis.
Sometimes, contracting out entailed loss
of union status and benefits, for affected
workers, such as due process in grievance
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procedures. The contracting out of an
entire low-skilled function in public
schools was always associated with lower
benefits and sometimes lower wages for
workers in these occupations. By law,
public school employees received pension
and other benefits, which were
considerably more generous than those
typically offered in the private sector to
low-skilled workers. In addition, wage
levels of contracted workers tended to be
lower than those paid to school
employees, who were often unionized. A
1994 Michigan law precluding union
bargaining over the contracting out of
noninstructional services, coupled with
financial pressures on public schools,
have led to a recent surge of contracting
out of these services.
In only one case that of an auto
supplier did an employer use temporary
agency workers on a long-term basis. This
auto supplier screened all new hires

Unless an organization's lowskilled employees are earning
above market compensation,
management will have little to
gain in terms of wage and
benefits cost savings from the use
of agency temporaries and
contractors. Where we observe
such use, the organization's
motivation is something else.
through a temporary help agency and
offered them permanent positions after six
months to a year or more far longer than
other auto suppliers using temporary
agencies for screening purposes. This
nonunion supplier paid its regular workers
wages and benefits comparable to
unionized plants in the area, a strategy
designed to improve the quality of its
employees and to avoid unionization.
However, in prolonging the probationary
period in its hiring through a temporary
agency, the company acknowledged
substantial savings in wage and benefits
costs.
Interestingly, the human resources
directors at the unionized auto supplier
plants also indicated that they would like

to be able to use temporary agency
workers more to save on labor costs.
However, unlike the situation in public
schools, unions in this sector were able to
prohibit or greatly restrict the use of
temporary agencies through collective
bargaining. These examples underscore
the importance that laws governing
collective bargaining have on the
incidence of outsourcing and ultimately
on compensation and other working
conditions in an industry.
Although outsourcing is often
associated with the substitution of agency
or contract company workers for higherpaid regular workers, evidence from our
case studies suggests that outsourcing
typically did not involve such substitution
on a permanent basis. Agency
temporaries usually were hired on a shortterm basis to fill in for an absent
employee, to staff a temporary project, or
to screen workers for permanent
positions. Particularly in hospitals,
agency temporaries' compensation was
similar to that of regular staff in
comparable positions; in a few cases, they
even earned more.
Only the management function was
contracted out in almost all of the
instances of contracting out in hospitals
and in about half of the instances in public
schools, so the wages and benefits of lowskilled workers in these functional areas
were unaffected. In these cases, schools
and hospitals believed any wage and
benefits cost savings from contracting out
the entire function were non-existent or
relatively small: the motivation for
contracting out the management function
was to achieve product or productivity
improvements and cost savings in other
areas.
The simple but important point is that
unless an organization's low-skilled
employees are earning above market
compensation, management will have
little to gain and workers will have little
to lose in terms of wage and benefits
cost savings from the use of agency
temporaries and contractors. Where we
observe such use, the organization's
motivation is something else.
A caveat to this conclusion is that
compensation among regular employees

JULY 2002

Employment Research
likely depends on the existence of
competition from staffing agencies and
contractors. It will be difficult for lowskilled workers and their union
representatives to raise compensation if
employers have the option of using lowcost third parties. We observed this sort
of dynamic in one of our public school
case studies. The previously mentioned
state law, which precluded collective
bargaining over the contracting out of
noninstructional services, paved the way
for this school district to contract out the
custodial services in some of its buildings.
The union was able to continue operating
in half of the buildings, but only because
it agreed to steep pay cuts for its higherpaid custodians and to the disciplining of
poor performers.
Potential Benefit: The Case of Tempo
rary Agencies and "Risky" Workers
When can workers actually benefit
from a temporary agency or contract
arrangement? Some workers, of course,
prefer temporary positions. Workers may
benefit from superior management skills
provided by a contractor. More
interesting is the use of temporary help
agencies for screening purposes. Here,
we argue, agency temporaries may benefit
from the arrangement, even when they
desire permanent positions and receive
lower wages than direct hires.
The use of agency temporaries for
screening purposes increased during the
late 1990s among employers in our case
studies as labor markets tightened and the
average quality of job applicants dropped.
Some of these employers began hiring
workers for certain low-skilled positions
exclusively through temporary agencies.
Others used a mixed hiring strategy. For
instance, one auto supplier directly hired
applicants with good work histories while
hiring others through a temporary agency
at lower wages and lower cost to the
company.
By lowering compensation and firing
costs, temporary help agencies made it
more attractive for companies to try out
workers with criminal records, poor work
histories, or otherwise "risky"
characteristics. Because many of these
workers might not otherwise have had the
opportunity to audition for a permanent

position, they potentially benefited from
the temporary employment arrangement.
At the same time, by lowering the
companies' costs of trying out riskier
workers, temporary help agencies
effectively expand the supply of potential
labor to a company. In this way,
companies may avoid raising wages in
order to attract more qualified candidates.
Furthermore, because increases in wages
for new workers are almost always
accompanied by increases in wages for
existing workers, the more general use of
agency temporaries may relieve upward
wage pressure in tight labor markets. 3
Conclusion
Sometimes an organization's
motivation for outsourcing low-skilled
jobs is to substitute lower-paid temporary
agency or contract company workers for
regular employees. Often, however, an
organization's motivation for outsourcing
is unrelated to wage and benefits cost
savings. Workers in low-skilled positions
may already receive relatively low pay,
and outsourcing involves no permanent
substitution of temporary or contract
company workers for regular employees.
Except to the extent that the existence of
an outsourcing option inhibits
compensation gains among low-skilled
workers, contracting out and the use of
agency temporaries has little apparent
effect on low-skilled workers.
The growing use of temporary
agencies to screen workers for permanent
positions illustrates the complexity of
assessing the impacts of temporary
agency work on low-skilled workers. Our
case study evidence suggests that often
workers hired through agencies are
deemed riskier than those hired directly,
rendering simple wage comparisons
between these two groups invalid.
Moreover, the fact that temporary
agencies sometimes lower compensation
costs and facilitate dismissal may be the
very reason some employers are willing
to try out certain workers. The potentially
more important impacts of temporary
employment are on workers' subsequent
employment and earnings. The extent to
which temporary agencies help open
doors to good jobs for low-skilled, risky
workers or instead channel them into low-

paying, dead-end assignments is an
important topic for future study.
Notes
1. We conducted extensive interviews with each
organization's managers, temporary agency or con
tract company representatives, and workers. We also
collected data on employment, wages, and benefits
by occupation for regular, temporary agency, and
contract workers from each organization.
2. An obvious caveat to the conclusion that lower
wages and benefits adversely affect workers is that
lower compensation may increase employment and
reduce unemployment in the long run. While these
long-term impacts are hotly debated in the econom
ics profession, we do not consider such macroeconomic effects here.
3. We develop these arguments, including why
employers may need a third party to lower the costs
of trying out risky workers, in Houseman, Kalleberg, and Erickcek (2001).
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in the old industrial sector that was
established during the socialist period.
The behavior of the old industrial firms
where socialist planning resulted in a
large concentration of capital and skilled
labor, and where the price, technology,
and competition shocks of transition have
been particularly severe is of particular
interest in Russia and other transition
economies.

Labor Market Developments in
Russian Industry
he Russian transition from
socialist planning toward market-based
allocation provides an interesting
opportunity to measure the role of the
labor market in generating economic
growth. A common but relatively little
examined assumption of economists is
that employment (or labor) allocation in
market economies responds to
productivity differentials across
alternative uses, with labor tending to
flow away from lower-valued uses and
toward those that are higher-valued.
During the Soviet period, however, jobs
were allocated across industries and
enterprises according to the dictates of
central planners, who were in turn guided
by the political leaders' preferences for
developing some sectors and types of
firms rather than others. For instance, the
mining, heavy manufacturing, and public
transportation industries received many
resources, as did larger firms and those
connected with the military, while the
consumer goods manufacturing and
service sectors, as well as smaller firms,
tended to be neglected.
How well did the Soviet planners do,
measured as the contribution of job
reallocation across firms to increased
productivity? And how has the
relationship between job and productivity
growth by industry changed since the
dramatic liberalization of markets and the
privatization of much of the economy in
the early 1990s? To what extent have the
patterns of job reallocation come to more
closely resemble those found in the
United States, and what factors tend to

increase the degree to which job
reallocation is productivity-enhancing?
Analysis of recently available data on
Russian firms provides some answers to
these questions. The data cover all
industrial enterprises in Soviet Russia in
1985-1991 and all medium- and largesized industrial enterprises since the
breakup of the Soviet Union in late 1991.
Firms with fewer than 100 employees are
excluded. The data, which provide
information similar to that in the U.S.
Annual Survey of Manufacturers (except
that they pertain to firms rather than
establishments), are well suited for
investigating the job reallocation process

Figure 1 displays information on the
evolution of industrial production,
employment, labor productivity, and the
real wage in Russia from 1990 to 2000.
Although the large magnitude of the
output decline in the early 1990s must be
taken somewhat cautiously (chiefly due to
problems in measuring inflation), the
broad trends are well accepted. The
"output shock" was especially severe in
Russia, where official industrial
production fell by more than 50 percent in
just the first four years of the 1990s. The
employment decline was also quite
drastic by international and historical
standards, with a fall of nearly 40 percent
by 1998. Nevertheless, the drop in
employment was more gradual than that

Figure 1 Production, Employment, Productivity, and Wages in Russian Industry,
1990-2000
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of output, resulting in a large initial
decline in labor productivity followed by
a partial recovery. Measured real wages,
here deflated by the official CPI, also fell
in the years to 1995 and have been
volatile since then.
The aggregate data show a clear
picture of an industrial sector in deep
depression during the 1990s. This raises
questions concerning the nature of the
decline. Does the rapid deindustrialization reflect a process of Schumpeterian
creative destruction, whereby the
economy gets rid of its over-built,
inefficient elements? Or does the
aggregate industrial decline reflect a
depression in which all economic activity
declines simultaneously and roughly
proportionately? A final possibility is that
the decline is actually more severe in the
more productive sectors of the economy,
suggesting sclerosis in an excessive
preservation of inefficient jobs and
unhealthy pressures on more productive
firms and sectors. Sclerosis is quite
plausible in Russia, where governments
(particularly local and regional
governments) may protect weak
enterprises, successful firms are subject to
public and private predation, and
stripping of assets most likely from
productive firms with valuable assets is
notoriously widespread. Addressing
these questions requires an analysis of
firm-level data that permit an assessment
of differences across firms and sectors in
employment and productivity growth.

Firm-Level Job Flows
The firm-level analysis follows
standard methodologies used in the
United States for measuring job creation
and job destruction, as the sources of
growth and decline in employment at the
firm level, respectively. The creation rate
is defined as the ratio of employment
growth in all expanding firms to total
employment, and the destruction rate is
the ratio of employment decline in all
contracting firms to total employment.
The reallocation rate a measure of the
total movement of jobs across firms is
defined as the sum of the creation and
destruction rates. Figure 2 contains
calculations of these rates on an annual

Figure 2 Job Creation and Job Destruction in Russia
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basis for the Russian industrial sector
from 1985 to 1999.
Job creation is low in this sector
throughout the period, but it does rise
significantly in the later years. If the
years are grouped into a rough "prereform" period (1985-1991) and a "postreform" period (1992-1999), the creation
rate rises from an average of 1.4 percent
in the first period to 2.4 percent in the
second. Note that the grouping of years is
defined around 1992, the year of the "big
bang" liberalization in Russia.
Job destruction exceeds creation in
every year, and it rises even much more in
the early 1990s, reaching the typical
range of the U.S. economy by 19921993. The gap between destruction and
creation widens substantially, confirming
the net employment decline in the official
aggregate data. Comparing the pre- and
post-reform periods, the average job
destruction rate more than doubles, rising
from 4.5 percent to 10.3 percent. As a
consequence of the rise in both creation
and destruction, the reallocation rate also
rises, from an average of 5.9 percent in
the pre-reform period to an average of
12.7 post-reform.

Job Flows and Firm Characteristics
How do the patterns of job flows relate
to observable firm characteristics? In
research on the United States, a principal
focus has been on variables that may be
associated with costs of labor adjustment,
such as size, capital intensity, average
wage, and labor productivity. The general
finding has been that each of these
variables tends to reduce the magnitude of
job reallocation. Analysis of the Russian
data shows that these characteristics had
an inconsistent relationship with these
variables in the pre-reform period;
however, all of these relationships moved
strongly toward negative. This suggests
that economic reforms have produced
patterns of job flows more akin to those in
market economies, and that Russian firms
have become more sensitive to adjustment
costs.
Of particular interest in the Russian
transition are the effects of market
competition and firm ownership on job
reallocation. Employment movements
may be taken as a measure of
restructuring, which the policies of
liberalization and privatization were
intended to promote. The data, however,
show no systematic tendency for firms of
private ownership or those operating in
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less concentrated product markets to
engage in higher levels of reallocation.
Productivity-Enhancing Job
Reallocation
How is job reallocation related to
productivity differentials across firms?
Do less productive firms tend to lose jobs
while the more productive tend to gain
them? Or is there no relationship, or even
possibly a negative one, between job
flows and relative productivity levels?
These questions can be addressed
using a decomposition of aggregate
industrial labor productivity growth. Our
analysis of the data suggests that while
average firm productivity was falling in
the post-reform period, which may be an
artifact of overstated inflation, changes in
the composition of Russian industry
partially offset this effect. The changes in
the relative employment shares of
different industries and of firms within
industries each worked to increase
productivity by more than 2 percent per
year, on average, in the post-reform
period. Taken together, the two types of
job flows produced nearly 5 percent
annual productivity growth.
These results contrast starkly with
those for the pre-reform period, when the
estimated contributions of job flows to

productivity growth are actually negative.
The magnitudes are tiny, implying that the
reallocation of labor under Soviet
planning was largely unrelated to
productivity differentials.
Finally, what is the impact of firm
characteristics, particularly ownership and
competition, on the job flows and
productivity growth? While private
ownership and market dispersion have no
tendency to raise the level of job
reallocation, the analysis finds that they
have strong positive effects on the
relationship of reallocation with
productivity differentials. This suggests
that privatization and liberalization
policies worked to focus job destruction
in the firms and sectors that were the least
productive in the Russian economy.
Conclusion
Basic economics teaches us that a
primary function of the labor market is to
allocate labor to its highest valued uses.
In the simplest textbook case of
homogeneous labor and perfect
competition, efficiency requires that the
marginal productivity of labor be equal in
all firms and all sectors of the economy.
In response to changes in the environment
(such as shifting consumer demand,
increased competition, or technological
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innovation), an "efficient" labor market is
supposed to facilitate adjustments that
reallocate labor to raise productivity.
This study of the Russian labor market
finds that prior to reforms, when Russia
was governed by Soviet planners, the
labor market functioning was not
consistent with this textbook model. The
movement of jobs across firms and
sectors was largely unrelated to
productivity differentials. After reforms,
however, Russian labor market
performance changed drastically, and job
reallocation worked to raise productivity
growth.
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